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ABSTRACT 
International environmental standards are rapidly changing, 
prompting states to reevaluate the sustainability of their 
developmental policies, including the negative effects that free trade 
agreements and investment treaties can have on the environment.  
This Article explores the tensions between international investment 
law and international environmental law that prompt investors to 
bring claims to international courts and arbitral tribunals alleging 
that their rights have been violated.  It discusses how arbitral 
tribunals evaluate investor claims and how they assess the 
legitimacy of governmental environmental protective measures.  
The Article then examines ways in which states can increase the 
likelihood that tribunals are sensitive to the need for environmental 
conservation and defer to state decision-making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Increasing globalization of economic activities through both 
trade and investment has contributed to rising GDP, improved 
standards of living, and general economic development in many 
parts of the world.  And while these advancements are positive, they 
do not come without costs, especially environmental ones.  As 
consensus emerges about the negative impact of human activity 
leading to environmental degradation, states are increasingly 
prioritizing environmental protection and sustainable development.  
States are beginning to cooperate on climate change issues as well, 
incorporating provisions that integrate environmental concerns in 
free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  
International courts and arbitral tribunals are following the same 
trend, and are starting to weigh environmental concerns more 
heavily when deciding the scope of a state’s regulatory sphere in 
investment arbitrations. 
Incorporating environmental provisions into BITs can prove 
disadvantageous to investors, however, thus prompting them to 
bring arbitral claims in hopes of securing more preferential 
treatment or compensation for their losses.  A growing number of 
investor claims based on losses suffered due to environmental 
regulations has “raised concerns that [ . . . ] large compensation bills 
might unduly constrain regulatory space.”1  Given these tensions 
between individual investors and the environmental goals of host 
states, arbitral tribunals must carefully balance interests. 
An important avenue for arbitral tribunals to justify deference to 
states’ environmental regulations is through treaty interpretation. 
Favorable treaty interpretation can help shield host states from 
claims based on violations of fair and equitable treatment or 
expropriation, and can ensure that states have the space to regulate 
based on both domestic environmental needs and their international 
commitments. 
Important questions remain, however.  How do arbitral 
tribunals evaluate the legitimacy of governmental regulations 
purported to prioritize environmental and human health?  And how 
much deference should tribunals accord, even when these measures 
are legitimate?  In drafting BITs, states can help extend the deference 
 
 1 Lorenzo Cotula, Expropriation Clauses and Environmental Regulation: Diffusion 
of Law in the Era of Investment Treaties, 24 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 
278, 287 (2015). 
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offered by tribunals by modeling provisions on those commonly 
included in free trade agreements and by looking towards other 
international courts to borrow their justifications for evolutionary 
treaty interpretation.2  This Article will review the role preambular 
provisions and explicit exceptions play in both trade and investment 
matters.  It will examine the investor treatment standards of fair and 
equitable treatment and expropriation to analyze how and under 
what circumstances arbitral tribunals are most likely to defer to 
states and their policy-making in investment cases. 
Part 1 will discuss treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, building the foundation for the 
application of treaty interpretation discussed throughout the paper.  
Part 2 examines trade disputes as they relate to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  In this section, the Article 
focuses on the way the GATT’s preambular provisions helped the 
Tribunal in the Shrimp/Turtle Dispute navigate the interpretation of 
the exceptions enshrined under GATT Article XX(g), and looks at 
the way in which current environmental and legal standards not yet 
formally enshrined in text can be incorporated into decision-
making, as seen in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case.  Part 3 then moves 
on to Bilateral Investment Treaties and first reviews BITs’ 
preambular provisions before summarizing explicit exceptions and 
carve outs.  Part 4 reviews standards of international law that are 
most applicable to investment disputes, namely the standard of fair 
and equitable treatment and expropriation, and includes discussion 
of notable cases.  Part 5 analyzes how tribunals should—and do—
assess fair and equitable treatment and expropriation claims, and 
provides recommendations to ensure that tribunals reach decisions 
that are sensitive to environmental measures. 
 
 2 In dispute resolution relating to treaties or agreements, courts and tribunals 
must often decide whether the meaning of terms enshrined in the documents in 
question can evolve over time or whether they retain the same meaning regardless 
of the changing socio-political context.  Evolutionary treaty interpretation favors 
the former approach: it involves applying modern conceptions of a term’s meaning, 
understood at the time of the dispute, instead of applying the understanding of the 
terms held at the time of the treaty’s inception.  See Joost Pauwelyn & Manfred Elsig, 
The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations Across International 
Tribunals, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 445, 453 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark 
A. Pollack eds., 2013) (stating that temporal considerations play a large role in 
determining the meaning behind a term). 
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1. TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF TREATIES 
Investment treaties are not entered into in vacuums; thus, it is 
important to recognize that while these treaties are aimed at 
attracting foreign investment by offering attractive protections and 
incentives to investors, host states must remain cognizant of their 
other international legal obligations.3  Since many BITs do not 
contain specific provisions relating to environmental conservation 
or those provisions, if they do exist, are sparse and largely 
unhelpful, tribunals can turn to treaty interpretation to broaden 
their scope.4  In these instances, tribunals turn to the rules of treaty 
interpretation codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.  Tribunals must interpret treaties “in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”5  
The Vienna Convention specifies that context for the purpose of 
treaty interpretation includes: any additional agreements made 
between the parties, subsequent agreements, State practice, other 
relevant rules of international law in force between the parties, and 
intent.6  The Vienna Convention also provides for supplementary 
means of interpretation, which include “the preparatory work of the 
treaty and circumstances of its conclusion.”7 
2. TRADE AND THE GATT 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a 
multilateral trade agreement, entered into force in 1948 as a 
mechanism to increase international trade between member states 
by reducing or eliminating barriers to trade.8  In the decades since 
 
 3 Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing 
Liability under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2011). 
 4 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Environmental Protection and Investment 
Arbitration: Yin and Yang?, ANUARIO COLOMBIANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 371, 
374 (2017). 
 5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 6 Id. art. 31. 
 7 Id. art. 32. 
 8 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Preamble, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
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the agreement’s conception, however, tensions have risen between 
liberalized trade and environmental protection, prompting disputes 
between member states. Many of these disputes are resolved in 
arbitral tribunals or courts, which often look to preambular 
provisions enshrined in agreements and to current standards in 
environmental management and conservation to determine whether 
measures could be justified under exceptions to the agreement. 
2.1. Preambular provisions 
Arbitral tribunals commonly turn to preambles to help reveal 
the object and purpose of a treaty and to guide the interpretation of 
substantive provisions, especially in disputes regarding free trade 
agreements.  One notable example of preambular provisions 
informing a decision from an arbitral tribunal is the Shrimp-Turtle 
Dispute.  In this case, the United States passed regulations requiring 
the use of Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) in all areas where there 
was a likelihood that shrimp would interact with sea turtles.9  These 
regulations resulted in an import ban on all shrimp and shrimp 
products from countries where shrimp was harvested using 
commercial technology that could adversely affect sea turtles.10  The 
regulations provided, however, that this ban would not apply to 
countries that were certified.11  India, Pakistan, Thailand, and 
Malaysia argued that these laws violated WTO rules because the 
import ban constituted “unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail[ed].”12  The tribunal 
considered whether Article XX(g) of the GATT, which states that 
 
 9 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, para. 2, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) 
[hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Dispute]. 
 10 Id. para. 3. 
 11 Certification would be granted to countries whose fishing environments 
posed no threats to sea turtles.  First, countries would be certified given the absence 
of the relevant species of sea turtles in their waters.  Second, certification would be 
granted if countries harvested shrimp exclusively in ways that posed no threat to 
sea turtles, such as artisanal ways.  And third, countries would be certified if they 
harvested shrimp in waters that had no sea turtles at all.  Certification would also 
be granted to countries who fell outside of the aforementioned parameters, but 
“that provide[d] documentary evidence of the adoption of a regulatory program 
governing the incidental taking of sea turtles . . . that [was] comparable to the 
United States program and where the average rate of incidental taking of sea turtles 
by their vessels [was] comparable to that of United States vessels.” Id. para. 3–4. 
 12 Id. para. 10. 
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countries can be exempted from GATT rules if the measures 
undertaken relate to “the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources,”13 was applicable, and turned to preambular provisions 
to instruct its determination. In interpreting the term “exhaustible 
natural resources,” the tribunal explained that: 
The words of Article XX(g), “exhaustible natural resources”, 
were actually crafted more than 50 years ago. They must be 
read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary 
concerns of the community of nations about the protection 
and conservation of the environment. While Article XX was 
not modified in the Uruguay Round, the preamble attached 
to the WTO Agreement shows that the signatories to that 
Agreement were, in 1994, fully aware of the importance and 
legitimacy of environmental protection as a goal of national 
and international policy. The preamble of the WTO 
Agreement—which informs not only the GATT 1994, but also 
the other covered agreements—explicitly acknowledges “the 
objective of sustainable development.”14 
The arbitral tribunal explained that the term “exhaustible 
natural resources” is not static, but indeed evolutionary,15 and found 
that sea turtles can be categorized as exhaustible natural resources.  
This determination led to the tribunal’s decision that while the U.S. 
import ban did indeed fall under the purview of the exception 
enshrined in Article XX(g) and under Article XX’s chapeau 
 
 13 GATT, supra note 8, art. XX(g); see also id. art. XX(b) (specifying that Parties 
may take any measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health.”). Article XX’s chapeau conditions these exceptions on the guarantee that 
states will “not appl[y] [the measures] in a manner that would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”  This requires that the measure be 
taken in good faith, because the exceptions are intended to help Parties promote 
their legitimate interests, not to retaliate amongst other Parties or gain an unfair 
advantage.  Compliance with the chapeau can be demonstrated in a variety of ways. 
The accused Party can show that the measures were a result of cooperation and 
agreement at the international level and that the measure was designed with 
flexibility in mind, taking into account different situations in different countries.  
The offending Party may also put forth an analysis showing a clear connection 
between the measure and the discrimination, identifying reasonable justifications 
for its reasoning.  WTO rules and environmental policies: GATT exceptions, WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm  
[https://perma.cc/X8XW-FYAG]. 
 14 Shrimp/Turtle Dispute, supra note 9, para. 129. 
 15 Id. para. 130. 
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procedurally,16 it failed to fulfill the requirements substantively.17  
The tribunal found that the measure was applied in a manner that 
constitutes arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination in that the ban 
was applied differently in “countries where the same conditions 
prevail.”18 
Tribunals in international investment arbitrations could 
potentially borrow the approach the tribunal took in the Shrimp-
Turtle Dispute in deciding trade disputes relating to supposed 
environmental conservation.  The tribunal stressed the importance 
of preambular provisions by explaining that “the specific language 
of the preamble to the WTO Agreement . . . gives colour, texture and 
shading to the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO 
Agreement, generally, and under the GATT 1994, in particular.”19  
And although the tribunal did not ultimately completely defer to the 
United States in its regulatory policy-making, the Shrimp-Turtle 
Dispute was nonetheless a pioneering case in that it affirmed that 
“WTO Members are free to adopt their own policies aimed at 
protecting the environment as long as, in so doing, they fulfill their 
obligations and respect the rights of other Members under the WTO 
Agreement.”20 
2.2. Current Standards 
International investment arbitral panels could also more readily 
consider current standards in international environmental 
management, policy-making, and law as opposed to standards in 
effect at the time of entrance into the agreement, as do courts such 
as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  A notable case in which 
the ICJ applied current standards is the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, 
 
 16 Id. para. 145. 
 17 Id. para. 160. In this case, the distinction between procedural and 
substantive adherence to Article XX(g) is one of superficial compliance versus 
compliance in application; intended versus actual effect. In the case of procedural 
compliance, the Tribunal examined the ban on its face to determine whether its 
general design reasonably related to the policy goal it intended to serve: protecting 
sea turtles.  Id. at para. 137–142.  Substantively, the Tribunal was concerned that the 
measure’s application did not constitute arbitrary discrimination and that it was 
not a “disguised restriction on international trade” as per the conditions set out in 
Article XX’s chapeau.  Id. at para. 160. 
 18 Id. para. 184. 
 19 Id. para. 155. 
 20 Id. para. 186. 
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where the Court considered the principles of prevention and 
precaution, intergenerational equity, and sustainable 
development.21 
In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
entered into a treaty to construct a system of dams on the Danube 
river.22  But after learning of the environmental risks associated with 
the project’s completion and after garnering intense criticism, 
Hungary suspended and then permanently abandoned the project.23  
Although the Court found that Hungary violated its treaty 
obligations by terminating construction,24 the Court stressed the 
importance of seriously considering the project’s detrimental impact 
on the environment and explained that current standards should be 
applied in these considerations:25 
Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness 
of the risks for mankind – for present and future generations 
– of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and 
unabated pace, new norms and standards have been 
developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during 
the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into 
consideration, and such new standards given proper weight, 
not only when States contemplate new activities but also 
when continuing with activities begun in the past. This need 
to reconcile economic development with protection of the 
environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable 
development.26 
By discussing the importance of current standards, the Court 
affirmed the living nature of treaties and their ability to evolve over 
time to adapt to changing norms in international law.  Therefore, 
although the Court ordered Hungary to resume its treaty 
obligations, it called on the parties to jointly decide on alternative 
measures that would be less taxing on the environment.27  The 
Court’s call to both the parties and future benches and panels to 
consider current standards in their decision-making was taken 
 
 21 Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 4, at 375. 
 22 Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 
1997 I.C.J., para. 15 [hereinafter Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case]. 
 23 Id. para. 22. 
 24 Id. para. 59. 
 25 Id. para. 140. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. para. 141. 
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seriously in subsequent decisions.  For example, in the Iron Rhine 
Arbitration, the Tribunal referenced the living nature of treaties 
developed in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case by noting that an 
“evolutive interpretation, which would ensure an application of the 
treaty that would be effective in terms of its object and purpose, will 
be preferred to a strict application of the intertemporal rule.”28 
Tribunals have continued the trend of interpreting treaties 
according to principles of international environmental law in place 
at the time of the decision in other cases as well. In the Indus Water 
Kishenganga Arbitration, the Tribunal said “principles of 
international environmental law must be taken into account even 
when . . . interpreting treaties concluded before the development of 
that body of law.”29 
3. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
Although one could plausibly argue that environmental 
considerations are not as central to investment as they are in trade, 
countries are increasingly recognizing the necessity of including 
conservation provisions in BITs as a way to both propel 
environmental protection and broaden the scope of their regulatory 
sphere in that area.  Scholars such as Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes have categorized these provisions in three categories.30  
The first category, provisions enshrined in preambles, function 
similarly to preambular provisions in free trade agreements, in that 
the commitments are expressed in general terms and are generally 
not binding.31  Second, provisions can function as exceptions, such 
as those found within Article XX(g) of the GATT Agreement.32  
These provisions may carve out a State’s specific regulatory 
powers.33  Such provisions are meant to provide States with space to 
set up environmental frameworks consistent with the goals of the 
BITs without the constant fear that they will be found to be in 
 
 28 Iron Rhine Railway (Kingdom of Belgium v. Kingdom of the Netherlands), 
PCA Case Repository, para. 80 (2005). 
 29 Indus Water Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India), Partial Award, 
PCA Case Repository, para. 452 (2013). 
 30 Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 4, at 380. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
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violation of investment standards such as fair and equitable 
treatment, expropriation, national treatment, or most favored 
nation.  And third, these environmental obligations may be found in 
provisions that delineate investors’ rights and responsibilities.34  
These obligations can include, but are not limited to, provisions on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) or requirements to submit 
environmental impact assessments at specified times.35  This third 
category of protection, however, is outside the scope of this paper 
and will not be discussed further. 
3.1. Preambular Provisions 
Provisions enshrined in preambles can help tribunals decipher 
the object and purpose of a treaty as codified by the treaty 
interpretation rules in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).  Trends show that states are increasingly beginning to 
include goals of environmental protection and sustainable 
development in the preambles of BITs; this is especially true of the 
past decade.  For example, a BIT between the United States and 
Rwanda from 2008 states that the goals of economic development 
should be “achieve[d] . . . in a manner consistent with the protection 
of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of 
internationally recognized labor rights.”36  In 2013, Canada and 
Benin entered into a BIT that “[r]ecogniz[ed] that the promotion and 
the protection of investments of investors . . . [is] conducive to the 
stimulation of mutually beneficial economic activity, the 
development of economic cooperation between both countries and 
the promotion of sustainable development.”37  And a BIT between 
Canada and China specified that that investment should be “based 
on the principles of sustainable development.”38 
 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, Rwanda-U.S., preamble, Feb. 19, 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 12-101. 
 37 Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Benin-Can., preamble, Jan. 9, 2013. 
 38 Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Can.-China, preamble, Sept. 9, 2012. 
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3.2. Explicit Exceptions 
BITs sometimes give states more explicit direction in their 
substantive provisions that discuss environmental policy-making.  
For example, many BITs entered into by the U.S. in the recent past 
provide that “[n]othing in [the] Treaty shall be construed to prevent 
a Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with [the] Treaty that it considers appropriate 
to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a 
manner sensitive to environmental concerns.”39  Canada’s Model 
BIT from 2004 carves out exceptions similar to those in Article XX of 
the GATT: 
[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a 
Party from adopting or enforcing measures necessary: (a) to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health; (b) to ensure 
compliance with laws and regulations that are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; or (c) for 
the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural 
resources.40 
Many BITs specify that the promotion of investment cannot 
simultaneously result in compromising environmental standards.  
The effect of these provisions is that they enlarge the scope of a 
State’s regulatory sphere by expressly declaring that states can 
adopt or monitor their environmental laws as they see fit.  Both the 
U.S. and Canadian Model BITs provide for this kind of provision.41  
A 2006 BIT between Belgium, the Luxembourg Economic Union, 
and Mozambique is a notable example of a BIT that includes this 
kind of strong provision.  The BIT provides: 
1. Recognizing the right of each Contracting Party to 
establish its own levels of domestic environmental 
 
 39 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 12(5) [hereinafter U.S. 
Model BIT], 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.p
df [https://perma.cc/H2UM-SC2R]. 
 40 2004 Canada Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 10(1) [hereinafter 
Canadian Model BIT], https://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-
FIPA-model-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UYG-5UBW]. 
 41 See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 39, art. 12(2) (discouraging weakening 
domestic environmental protections in order to encourage investment); Canadian 
Model BIT, supra note 40, art. 11 (similarly discouraging relaxing environmental 
protections in order to encourage investment). 
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protection and environmental development policies and 
priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its 
environmental laws, each Contracting Party shall strive to 
continue to improve those laws  . . . 
3. The Contracting Parties reaffirm their commitments 
under the international environmental agreements, which 
they have accepted. They shall strive to ensure that such 
commitments are fully recognized and implemented by their 
domestic laws.42These provisions could also be relevant in 
cases where new scientific evidence has emerged since the 
parties have entered into the BIT.  In these cases, the state 
may have a duty to heed the overwhelming scientific 
consensus, especially if other states are taking on new 
obligations.  The failure to keep up with standards in 
environmental law may inadvertently and unfairly lead to 
competitive advantages that benefit states who have not 
adopted more stringent environmental provisions to the 
detriment of the more environmentally progressive states.  
Thus, provisions that allow states, or even obligate them, to 
prioritize new international environmental agreements and 
standards are important because they reduce the perverse 
incentive for states to delay the enactment of new 
environmental provisions in hopes of becoming 
comparatively more competitive in attracting foreign 
investment. 
4. STANDARDS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Preambular provisions and explicit exceptions may deflate the 
likelihood of investor recovery in some cases, but they do not shield 
states from all investor claims.  It is essential to bear in mind 
standards that are foundational to international investment, and 
evaluate investor claims on a case by case basis.  Although standards 
like most favored nation and national treatment are important in 
investment, the standards that are most relevant to investment in 
relation to environmental conservation and policy-making are fair 
 
 42 Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
Belg.-Lux. Econ. Union-Mozam., art. 7, July 18, 2006. 
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and equitable treatment (FET) and expropriation.  These two 
standards will be the focus of this section. 
4.1. Fair and Equitable Treatment 
The FET standard in international investment law is an 
obligation for States to treat investors fairly; it is intended to protect 
investors from discriminatory or arbitrary conduct.43  FET is an 
absolute minimum standard by which the host state promises to 
treat investors in accordance with international law.44  FET includes 
the obligations of providing a stable and predictable environment, 
the protection of legitimate expectations, substantive and 
administrative due process, transparency, reasonableness, and 
proportionality in relation to host states’ governmental actions.45  A 
violation of FET does not always require bad faith on the part of the 
host state; investors may be able to claim damages if the host state is 
acting in an improper or unreasonable way.46  Arbitral tribunals 
have awarded damages in a variety of circumstances, such as cases 
where the State changed its tax rates,47 where the State has refused 
to modify its gas tariff rates and transferred the rights to another 
public utility service during a financial crisis,48 or where a State 
failed to issue municipal landfill permits.49  Some scholars say that 
governmental actions likely violate FET if specific representations, 
assurances, or contractual obligations are violated, or if legislative 
changes are accompanied by procedural deficiencies.50 
 
 43 Azernoosh Bazrafkan & Alexia Herwig, Reinterpreting the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Provision in International Investment Agreements as a New and More 
Legitimate Way to Manage Risks, 7 EUR. J. RISK REG. 439, 441 (2016). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Occidental v. Ecuador (UNCITRAL/LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, 1 
July 2004), paras. 85, 92. 
 48 Suez et al. v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, 
30 July 2010), para. 226 [hereinafter Suez v. Argentina]. 
 49 Metalclad v. Mexico (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, Aug. 30, 2000), 
paras. 103–107 [hereinafter Metalclad]. 
 50 Bazrafkan et al., supra note 43, at 442. 
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4.1(a). Suez et al. v. Argentina 
In the case of Suez et al. v. Argentina, the Argentine government 
privatized the country’s public services because of the deterioration 
of the water and sewage quality and the inability of the service to 
reach all inhabitants of the city of Buenos Aires.51  At the same time, 
Argentina was beginning to get mired in financial troubles.  During 
the financial crisis in 2000, the government de-linked the Argentine 
peso from the U.S. dollar, majorly devaluing the currency.52  This 
caused the Claimants’ costs for providing the services to rise, but the 
government refused to modify the tariff rates they were allowed to 
collect to cushion the setbacks in profits.53  Consequently, investors 
were not able to earn a reasonable rate of return and the company 
was not able to continue investment in service improvements, 
leading to suspect levels of nitrate in the water.54  Concerned with 
water quality, the government transferred the water management 
company to another entity (one owned by the Argentine 
government) without allowing the Claimants time to remedy the 
situation.55  Although the Tribunal did not find that the government 
expropriated the Claimant’s company in this case, it did find that 
the investor’s legitimate expectations were frustrated, and thus 
ruled that Argentina violated the fair and equitable treatment 
standard.56 
The result of Suez et al. v. Argentina is hardly surprising, 
especially given that the government’s decision-making was not 
clearly motivated by strong environmental interests. Although one 
reason for the government’s decision to transfer ownership from the 
Claimant to another entity was its dissatisfaction and concern with 
the water quality,57 it is likely that the greater motivation was the 
unraveling of the country’s financial stability. Concern with 
financial stability in turn led to restructuring of the currency peg that 
forced the Claimants into financial ruin, preventing them from 
providing quality services to inhabitants of the area.  It is possible 
 
 51 Suez v. Argentina, supra note 48, paras. 26–29. 
 52 Id. para. 44 (discussing the Argentine government’s actions during the 2000 
financial crisis). 
 53 Id. para. 50 (discussing the results in Suez v. Argentina). 
 54 Id. paras. 55–56. 
 55 Id. para. 56. 
 56 Id. para. 226. 
 57 Id. para. 56. 
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that the result would differ had the government’s environmental 
concerns been at the forefront of their decision-making.  It seems, 
then, that in cases where concern for the environment is a 
justification for a measure taken by a state, a tribunal will more 
likely dismiss investor claims if the environmental justification is at 
the center of the state’s decision-making. 
4.1(b). Renewable Energy in Spain 
While arbitral cases in which investors claim losses due to the 
negative impact that new environmental regulations have on their 
investments are fairly common, cases in which investors are harmed 
due to a state revoking laws and regulations that actually positively 
affect the environment are quite rare.  In these cases, tribunals, 
especially more progressive tribunals seeking to promote 
environmentally conscious policies, may be faced with unique 
challenges in their decision-making: should the tribunal award 
compensation to investors in hopes of stressing the importance of 
the now-defunct environmental policies, or should the tribunal 
“maintain[] the State’s sovereign ability to revoke support systems 
as it sees fit?”58 Spain’s recent withdrawal of substantial support for 
renewable energy poses this conundrum. 
In the mid-1990s, Spain sought to take advantage of its abundant 
sunshine and windy Northern regions59 by implementing a feed-in 
tariff60 scheme that sought to encourage investors to participate in 
 
 58 Rachel A. Nathanson, The Revocation of Clean-Energy Investment Economic-
Support Systems as Indirect Expropriation Post-Nykomb: A Spanish Case Analysis, 98 
Iowa L. Rev. 863, 902 (2013). 
 59 See A Guide to the Winds of Spain, SPAIN GUIDES, 
https://spainguides.com/weather/winds-spain/ [https://perma.cc/S66A-
VSCV] (listing the many terms the Spanish use for wind and commenting on the 
importance of wind as a part of Spain’s energy generation portfolio); see also Climate 
in Spain, JUST LANDED, 
https://www.justlanded.com/english/Spain/Articles/Culture/Climate-in-Spain 
[https://perma.cc/3PZW-FQJL] (noting that Spain has roughly 300 days of 
sunshine per year and strong winds with sustained speeds of up to 200km/h in the 
northern regions of the country). 
 60 See Toby Couture & Yves Gagnon, An Analysis of Feed-in Tariff Remuneration 
Models: Implications for Renewable Energy Investment, 38 ENERGY POLICY 955, 955 
(2010) (noting that feed-in tariffs offer investors guaranteed prices over a fixed 
period of time for production of renewable energy, and asserting that this scheme 
reduces investment risk by “enabl[ing] investors to be remunerated according to 
the actual costs of [renewable energy] project development”). 
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the precursor to the clean energy revolution.61  The purpose of the 
feed-in tariffs was to stimulate investment by assuring ease of 
market entry and a high purchase price for all developers, both large 
and small.62  However, Spanish laws prohibited utilities from 
passing on these high rates to consumers,63 so the government 
provided large subsidies to offset the utilities’ internalized costs.64  
By 2012, the Spanish government had given out over 8.1 billion 
euros in subsidies to all renewables, leading to a massive tariff 
deficit65 accounting for 3% of Spanish GDP: this contributed to 
Spain’s serious financial crisis in 2008. 66  To manage debt that was 
spiraling out of control, Spain passed a law that retroactively cut 
subsidies.67 
Investors in renewable energy projects are understandably 
frustrated, as these retroactive measures are less about achieving 
 
 61 See generally Feed-in Tariffs, International Energy Agency (May 2, 2017), 
https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/spain/name-21057-en.php 
[https://perma.cc/FHC6-MBP2] (detailing the assistance offered to renewable 
energy sources by Royal Decrees in the form of feed-in tariffs); see also Feed-In Tariffs: 
A Brief History, Building Efficiency Initiative (Aug. 5, 2010), 
http://www.buildingefficiencyinitiative.org/articles/feed-tariffs-brief-history 
[https://perma.cc/96XH-GDL2] (profiling the history of feed-in tariffs and how 
they have historically been used to improve the competitiveness of nascent 
renewable energy sources in the market). 
 62 Paul Noothout, et al., Report, The Impact of Risks in Renewable Energy 
Investment and the Role of Smart Policies, DiaCore 19 (2016). 
 63 Spain Halts Feed-In-Tariffs for Renewable Energy, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Apr. 
9, 2012), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/spain-halts-feed-in-
tariffs-for-renewable-energy/ [https://perma.cc/J862-JZYC]. 
 64 The cost del sol, ECONOMIST (July 20, 2013), 
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21582018-sustainable-energy-
meets-unsustainable-costs-cost-del-sol [https://perma.cc/Z6TH-7Z2X]. 
 65 The tariff deficit is now over 24 billion euros.  Spain Halts Feed-In-Tariffs for 
Renewable Energy, supra note 63; Securitisation of the electricity tariff deficit, INT’L. FIN. 
L. REV. (June 3, 2010), http://www.iflr.com/Article/2584079/Securitisation-of-the-
electricity-tariff-deficit.html [https://perma.cc/6P77-VLFW]. 
 66 The cost del sol, supra note 64. 
 67 Real Decreto-ley (R.D.) 2/2013, de 2 de febrero, De Medidas Urgentes en el 
Sistema Eléctrico y en el Sector Financier, BOE-A-2013-1117.  See Michael 
McGovern, Spain passes retroactive subsidy cut law, WIND POWER (June 14, 2014), 
https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1298015/spain-passes-
retroactive-subsidy-cut-law [https://perma.cc/T9U9-8NNP] (announcing the 
Spanish government’s passage of a decree that would retroactively cut incentives 
provided to renewable energy); see also Arjun Mahalingam & David M. Reiner, 
Energy Subsidies at Times of Economic Crisis: A Comparative Study and Scenario Analysis 
of Italy and Spain (Energy Policy Research Group Working Paper, University of 
Cambridge 2016) (discussing the approaches that both Italy and Spain took with 
respect to the costs of renewable energy incentives during the Global Financial 
Crisis). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
1006 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:4 
environmental goals than they are reflective of Spain’s poor 
financial planning.  Distraught investors are bringing FET claims in 
Spain’s highest courts and in arbitral tribunals, claiming that Spain 
has violated obligations under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
which governs these agreements.68  There are arguments, albeit 
weak ones, that Spain’s measures could be protected under either 
Article 24(2)(b)(i) of the ECT, which gives governments space to 
enact measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health,69 or Article 24(3)(c), which allows states to enact measures 
necessary for the maintenance of the public order.70  The retroactive 
subsidy cuts could be seen as protecting human life and health 
under Article 24(2)(b)(i) if one assumes that a financial crisis 
resulting from a government’s large debt would prevent the 
government from providing crucial public services (such as 
healthcare) in order to first service non-essential spending on 
promises made to foreign investors.  It is also possible that these 
cost-costing measures could be justified as a means to keep public 
discontent over the state’s finances at bay under Article 24(3)(c), if 
the government has reason to believe that this discontent could 
somehow negatively affect the functioning of the State. 
These arguments, however, are tangential at best, and it is 
obvious that Spain’s motives stemmed not from concern for public 
health, but because the government realized just how unsustainable 
its subsidy program was. Thus far, investors have had more luck 
recovering damages in arbitration than in domestic courts: the 
Spanish Supreme Court is standing by the government’s debt 
management strategy and ruled in 2016 that the retroactive subsidy 
cuts were constitutional.71  Investors have had better luck in the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).  In 2017, ICSID found that Spain violated the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, thus violating Article 10 of the Energy 
 
 68 See generally The Energy Charter Treaty, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY CHARTER, 
Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95., 
https://energycharter.org/process/energy-charter-treaty-1994/energy-charter-
treaty/ [https://perma.cc/F5V2-BKJZ] (describing the Energy Charter Treaty as a 
legally binding document that focuses on protecting foreign investments against 
key non-commercial risks, amongst other areas). 
 69 Id. art. 24(2)(b)(i). 
 70 Id. art. 24(3)(c). 
 71 Reyes Rincón, Spain’s Supreme Court backs renewable energy cuts, EL PAÍS (June 
2, 2016), 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2016/06/02/inenglish/1464860925_523010.html 
[https://perma.cc/9YKG-87NT]. 
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Charter Treaty, and awarded the claimants 128 million euros in 
compensatory damages.72  A year later, in May 201873 and June 
201874, ICSID once again found that Spain violated the standard of 
fair and equitable treatment and ruled in favor of investors. 
A plausible interpretation of these rulings is that ICSID sees the 
value in encouraging the proliferation of clean energy and seeks to 
promote a host state’s policy-making targeted in that direction.  By 
ordering compensation for investor losses, ICSID may be signaling 
that revoking environmental benefits should be avoided, even if a 
state finds itself in a precarious budgetary dilemma.  In this way, 
ICSID may be trying to prevent aversion for further investment in 
renewables or other environmentally sound policies, especially in 
the particular host state.75  The results of these arbitral cases, then, 
may have important implications for environmental law-making in 
the future, as these results indicate that fulfilling investor 
expectations, especially in relation to environmental incentives, is 
crucial if the goal is to increase innovation and investment in 
renewable energy. 
4.2. Expropriation 
Foreign investors may also bring claims in arbitral tribunals 
based on expropriation, which can be generally defined as the 
 
 72 See Miguel Ángel Noceda, Spain loses first arbitration claim over energy 
subsidies, EL PAÍS (May 5, 2017), 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/05/05/inenglish/1493988308_857826.html 
[https://perma.cc/5ADD-KFQ5] (discussing instances of investors winning in 
arbitration claims). 
 73 Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/14/1; Trishna Menon, ICSID Tribunal Finds Spain in Breach of the FET 
Standard Under the Energy Charter Treaty, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July 30, 
2018), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2018/07/30/icsid-tribunal-finds-spain-in-
breach-of-the-fet-standard-under-the-energy-charter-treaty-masdar-solar-wind-
cooperatief-ua-v-kingdom-spain-icsid-trishna-menon/ [https://perma.cc/P8J6-
SGMY]. 
 74 Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia 
Termosolar B.V. v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31; Trishna 
Menon, Spain Found to Have Breached the Energy Charter Treaty in Award by ICSID 
Tribunal, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2018/10/17/spain-found-to-have-breached-the-
energy-charter-treaty-in-award-by-icsid-tribunal-trishna-menon/ 
[https://perma.cc/7XVB-GPWC]. 
 75 Nathanson, supra note 58, at 902–903. 
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confiscation of property by a state.76  Protection from expropriation 
can be found in BITs, multilateral agreements, and international 
investment agreements: in most cases, these provisions are similarly 
drafted.  For the purposes of this paper, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will be used as an example of a 
multilateral agreement containing such a provision. 
Protection from expropriation can be found in Article 1110 of 
NAFTA.77  This provision specifies that governments cannot 
nationalize or expropriate any investment except for a public 
purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with due 
process of law and international law, and on payment of fair 
compensation.78  Expropriation need not be outright and deliberate; 
instead, veiled interference with the use of property that deprives 
the owner, at least in significant part, of the reasonably expected 
economic benefit is also expropriation, albeit indirect 
expropriation.79  Cases have shown that in assessing expropriation 
claims, tribunals will often consider three main factors: (1) the extent 
of the interference; (2) the reasonableness of the investors’ legitimate 
expectations; and (3) the character and purpose of the measure.80  
The greater the interference with the investment, the more likely it 
is that a tribunal will find that the state is in violation of its 
obligations.81  NAFTA requires governments to treat arbitration 
awards as binding.82 
While the treaty provides ample protections for investors, it also 
recognizes the importance of environmentalism.  The Preamble 
states that Parties should endeavor to achieve treaty goals “in a 
manner consistent with environmental protection and 
conservation,” to “promote sustainable development,” and to 
“strengthen the development and enforcement of environmental 
 
 76 See J. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and 
Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 465, 465 (1999) (discussing ways 
in which foreign investors can bring claims in arbitral tribunals based on 
expropriation). 
 77 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 
chapter 11, 32 I.L.M. 638 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Metalclad, supra note 49, para. 103. 
 80 Moloo et al., supra note 3, at 24. 
 81 Id. 
 82 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 194, art. 54(1). 
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laws and regulations.”83  NAFTA also includes provisions regarding 
the environment in its investment chapter.  Article 1114 specifies 
that nothing in the agreement prevents Parties from “adopting, 
maintaining, or enforcing any measure [ . . . ] that it considers 
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is 
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.”84  The 
same provision also details that Parties cannot relax domestic health, 
safety, or environmental measures to encourage investment.85  
Furthermore, NAFTA specifically carves out exceptions for 
environmental protection by borrowing the language enshrined in 
GATT Articles XX(b) and XX(g)86 which detail instances in which 
parties may be exempt from WTO rules in pursuit of their 
environmental goals.87  Parties that believe that other members have 
relaxed their environmental standards to attract investment are not 
powerless and may seek consultations with the other Party to 
remedy the issue.88 
NAFTA’s goals to increase free trade without compromising 
environmental quality do sometimes result in tension.  Because 
increased trade and investment often result in environmental 
degradation, states must often make compromises between forging 
favorable investment climates and protecting the environment.  In 
justifying regulations that promote environmental health but harm 
investors, states often refer to the “polluter pays principle,” a key 
tenet of international environmental law implied in the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development that states that those 
responsible for environmental harm must also bear the cost of 
protecting the environment.89  This principle can be interpreted to 
mean that states can shift the burden of protecting the environment 
on those who directly harm it: the investors that engage in pollution 
of other environmental harm through the normal operation of their 
investments. Notwithstanding this principle, states are not free to 
shift all costs of environmental protections on investors and are still 
 
 83 NAFTA, supra note 77, preamble. 
 84 Id. art. 1114. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. art. 2101.1. 
 87 See note 9 and accompanying text for discussion of articles XX(b), XX(g), and 
the chapeau.  GATT, supra note 8, art. XX(b), art. XX(g). 
 88 NAFTA, supra note 77, art. 1114.2. 
 89 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.I51/26/rev.1 (Vol. 1), annex 1 
(Aug. 12, 1992). 
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subject to expropriation claims.  Even if governmental measures that 
shift burdens are necessary to protect human and animal life and 
health, investors may bring claims of expropriation when their 
property is confiscated, either partially or fully.  For the most part, 
however, international law specifies that a “State is not liable for 
economic injury which is a consequence of bona fide ‘regulation’ 
within the accepted police power of states,”90 so regulations seen as 
essential to state function, such as anti-trust, environmental 
protection, and land planning, are outside the scope of 
categorization as takings.91  As long as the actions leading to indirect 
expropriation bear are “reasonable,” tribunals will generally 
disallow compensation for expropriation claims.  Some scholars go 
further, however, and feel that protective measures should not be 
subject to expropriation claims in all but the most extreme 
circumstances.92  They argue that allowing actionable claims to arise 
from legitimate environmental measures and forcing the 
government to provide compensation results in a undesirable 
externality: instead of making the “polluter pay” for their 
wrongdoing, this shifts the cost of environmental harm onto the 
innocent general public.93 
Determining whether a governmental regulation amounts to 
expropriation and is thereby compensable is made more difficult if 
the expropriation is indirect rather than direct.  It is easier for courts 
and arbitral tribunals to decide whether an expropriation is 
compensable in the latter case.  Although there is no codified 
standard to guide courts and tribunals in determining what qualifies 
as indirect expropriation and what falls short, common themes are 
emerging for general considerations.  One of these criteria is the 
effect of the measure on the owner.94  Measures may be seen as 
indirect expropriation if they result “[ . . . ] in the effective loss of 
management, use or control, or a significant depreciation of the 
value, of the assets of a foreign investor.”95  Tribunals sometimes 
 
 90 Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Interlocutory Award, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 248, 275 (1985). 
 91 Wagner, supra note 76, at 517. 
 92 Id.  
 93 Id. at 528. 
 94 Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Development, 11 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L. 
J. 64, 79 (2002). 
 95 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements: Takings of Property, U.N. Doc 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15, at 2 (2000). 
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refuse to consider a government’s intent in its policy-making, and 
merely consider the effect of the measure;96 this is called the “sole 
effect doctrine.”97  In cases where courts eschew applying the sole 
effect doctrine, they also consider the measure’s character and 
purpose.98  Here, the government’s intent is important; courts will 
rarely find that bona fide policy-making, if applied generally, does 
not fall within the state’s police powers and amounts to indirect 
expropriation.99 
4.2(a). Metalclad v. Mexico 
A notable and foundational example of a tribunal’s deferral to 
investor interests is the case of Metalclad v. Mexico, in which the 
Tribunal found that the government of Mexico violated both the 
standards of fair and equitable treatment and indirect 
expropriation.100  In Metalclad, the municipality in question denied a 
local construction permit because of its conviction that granting it 
would cause the landfill to fill with hazardous waste that would 
have a negative impact on the water quality and environment.101  
The denial of the permits was not baseless: environmental experts, 
geologists, and local citizens were skeptical of the environmental 
impact assessment completed by Metalclad that was required by the 
government.102  In light of reports from geologists that stated the 
landfill could poison the local water supply, the Governor decided 
to shut down the landfill.103  Notwithstanding these environmental 
assessments, the Tribunal found that the municipality was acting 
outside its authority and that the refusal to grant the permits was 
unfounded.104  The Tribunal also took issue with the Ecological 
Decree, an official order by the Governor that created an ecological 
preserve that included the landfill site.105  This Decree essentially 
 
 96 Metalclad, supra note 49, para. 111. 
 97 Dolzer, supra note 94, at 79–80. 
 98 Moloo et al., supra note 3, at 15. 
 99 Id. at 16. 
 100 Metalclad, supra note 49, para. 104. 
 101 Id. para. 106. 
 102 Trying to Give the NACEC Teeth, in LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL REPORTS: 
MEXICO AND NAFTA REPORTS at 4 (May 9, 1996) in Wagner, supra note 76, at 489. 
 103 Metalclad, supra note 49, para. 59. 
 104 Id. para. 107. 
 105 Id. para. 109. 
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had the effect of forever barring the operation of the landfill; the 
Tribunal did not take the Government’s arguments to the contrary 
seriously.106  It decided that the Government’s motivation for 
passing this measure was irrelevant to the claim, and that although 
a finding that the Ecological Decree was expropriation was not 
necessary to find that the government violated NAFTA Article 1110, 
the implementation of the Decree amounted to expropriation.107  In 
coming to this conclusion, the Tribunal utilized the sole effect 
doctrine and considered only the effect of the measure on the 
investor, without taking into account the government’s motivations 
or intent.108  These facts, combined with Metalclad’s reasonable 
reliance on the representations of the Mexican government, led the 
Tribunal to decide in favor of the investor.109 
4.2(b). The Chemtura and Bilcon Cases 
Recent investment claims challenging environmental 
regulations have been less successful than early ones such as 
Metalclad,110 exemplifying that tribunals are beginning to take 
environmental measures and states’ justifications for enacting them 
more seriously.  In a significant case from 2010 involving a U.S.-
based chemical manufacturer claiming that Canada violated its 
treaty obligations by banning an agro-chemical called lindane,111 the 
Tribunal rejected the Claimant’s arguments requesting 
compensation for expropriation and breach of FET.112  The Tribunal 
unanimously decided that the environmental measures taken by 
Canada were a valid use of their police powers, in part because the 
acts were “[ . . . ] motivated by the increasing awareness of the 
dangers presented by lindane for human health and the 
environment.”113 
 
 106 Id. paras. 109–111. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. para. 111. 
 109 Id. para. 107. 
 110 Moloo et al., supra note 3, at 1. 
 111 Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Final Award, NAFTA/UNCITRAL paras. 11–
14 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010). 
 112 Id. paras. 92–96. 
 113 Id. para 266. 
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Nonetheless, steps forward are also countered with steps back. 
In the 2015 Bilcon, the Canadian government rejected investors’ 
project proposals to construct and operate a quarry114 amongst 
criticism from the community concerned about the quality of the 
environment and quality of life were the quarry to be constructed, 
and an unfavorable report detailing the detrimental impact to the 
environment.115  The Tribunal agreed with the investor’ arguments 
that the government violated their legitimate expectations for profit 
because it found that the government made specific assurances that 
were disappointed.116  On the other hand, the dissent argued that the 
Tribunal’s dismissal and misunderstanding of the substance, and of 
the importance, of the community’s “core values,” (the historic 
preservation of the use of the area by the Aboriginal people, fishing, 
quality of life, a high quality of air and water, and a sense of 
community and heritage), was unwarranted.117  The dissent 
lamented the implications of this decision, stating that “ . . .  the 
decision [ . . . ] will be seen as a remarkable step backwards in 
environmental protection.”118  This case elucidates the prominent 
influence of corporate interests on environmental policy-making, 
and the lack of respect for, or recognition of, the legitimacy of 
concern regarding the deterioration of community values.  The 
Bilcon case highlights the importance of backing up sincere concerns 
for quality of life with real scientific evidence or rigorous studies 
showing a significant detrimental effect. 
5. FET AND EXPROPRIATION CLAIM ASSESSMENT 
Although assessments of expropriation and FET claims involve 
the use of different tests, it may be useful to think about state 
wrongdoing in a somewhat more abstract sense that combines 
elements of both evaluative standards.  When assessing a claim, 
tribunals must decide whether the environmental justifications 
underlying governmental regulations were legitimate.  They must 
 
 114 Bilcon Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Final Award, para. 5 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 2015). 
 115 Id. paras. 162–163, 219. 
 116 Id. paras. 447–448. 
 117 Bilcon Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Dissent, para. 23 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 2015). 
 118 Id. para. 51. 
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look to see that they are objectively, scientifically backed, and that 
the measure is not merely a veiled attempt at protectionism or a 
political play.119  States should also take care to comply with 
requirements to conduct risk assessments or cost-benefit 
evaluations.120  Even though many agreements do not require risk 
assessments, doing so can add credence to the state’s claim that their 
measures are backed by objective scientific evidence. 
Specific commitments and assurances made to investors 
complicate this analysis: if specific commitments are made to an 
investor and the state knowingly regulates against those assurances, 
their actions may not be legitimate. In this case, even objective 
evidence of the validity of the environmental concern may not be 
enough to shield government actions.121  Regardless of whether 
specific promises were made or not, tribunals should take care to 
evaluate the specific facts of the case.  If the time elapsed between 
the specific assurances and the measure is long enough, tribunals 
may find the specific assurance less central to their determination.  
Tribunals should look at both current standards of international 
environmental law and the state of knowledge at the time the 
specific assurance was made and the time the regulation went into 
effect.  If new scientific discoveries have been made in the interim, 
tribunal may find that the regulation was legitimate and that the 
harm may not be compensable.122 
A tribunal’s assessment does not end at the finding that the 
regulation was legitimate, however; it must next consider whether 
the measure is proportionate to its aim.123  When determining 
compensation, the tribunal must engage in balancing: citizens 
should not bear the entire cost of regulations as a result of new 
scientific discoveries in the environmental sphere, but investors 
should not have to bear all the risk associated with new and often 
unpredictable discoveries.124  Inherent in balancing interests is the 
need to determine whether the investor’s expectations were 
legitimate.  Scholars suggest that tribunals should adopt a simple 
distinction to allot an appropriate amount of political risk to 
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investors, namely that investors be compensated when specific 
assurances are made but not compensated when assurances of this 
nature are not made.125  Although this distinction is helpful, 
investors should nonetheless be able to make a showing why the 
government’s act was disproportionate and tribunals should 
carefully attempt to balance interests in these determinations.126 
Some cases suggest that a proportionality analysis must include 
a determination of whether the measure adopted was least 
restrictive with trade or investment.  In the NAFTA dispute of S.D. 
Meyers, the Canadian government banned the export of a hazardous 
chemical compound called polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB), 
effectively eliminating the Claimant’s purpose for investing in 
Canada.127  Canada asserted that the ban was necessary to protect 
human life and health and the environment, because exportation 
without the assurance that the PCBs would be correctly disposed of 
poses a significant threat to the environment.128  The Tribunal found 
that Canada violated the minimum standard of treatment,129 and 
that it was obligated to adopt an alternative that was least restrictive 
to trade.130  Scholars argue that in interpreting case law arising out 
of WTO agreements, the Tribunal adopted too restrictive of a 
standard that cannot be read into the text of the NAFTA or GATT 
and that an evaluation of the proportionality of the measure is 
sufficient.131 
The precautionary principle is also relevant to the 
proportionality analysis.  If the potential risk is grave enough and 
the potential effects detrimental enough, a state may be able to make 
the case that their regulations are still appropriate, even though no 
actual harm has yet been suffered.132  Tribunals should also consider 
whether there were any serious procedural deficiencies that further 
harmed the investor.133  States can ensure that their actions are 
procedurally fair by ensuring that they are transparent, consistent, 
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and provide investors with procedural fairness in governmental 
regulating.134 
6. CONCLUSION 
As consensus that environmental conversation is a necessity 
grows, tribunals will likely defer to states in their environmental 
policy-making at a higher rate.  In order to expand their regulatory 
spheres and increase the likelihood of favorable results, states 
should be sure to include provisions that carve out exceptions for 
environmental policy-making in their BITs.  Further, states should 
include the centrality of environmentalism and sustainable 
development to their national priorities in preambular provisions, 
which may help guide the interpretation of exceptions included 
further in the treaty.  Cases have shown that states have the greatest 
success in justifying environmental regulations when the reasons 
behind the policy-making are based on objective, scientific evidence 
instead of merely aspirational concerns for the well-being of the 
inhabitants or environment.  Substantively fair and legitimate 
policy-making is not enough to stand the tests of arbitral tribunals, 
however; states must not forget that providing a stable investment 
environment also involves according administrative due process 
and upholding a high level of transparency.  By holding themselves 
to high standards of policy-making, states will be able to fairly 
allocate the cost of environmentalism between their citizens and 
investors and build trusting relationships with current and future 
investors, ensuring both a flourishing investment environment and 
a path to sustainable development. 
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